It was not until 1958 that Soviet historians recognized Churchill`s account in triumph and tragedy and denied it only to deny it. [69] Soviet diplomat Igor Zemskov wrote in the historical journal Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn that Churchill`s assertion of a percentage agreement was a baseless „sordid and rude“ lie and said that Stalin had not made such an offer that it would have refused if it had been made. [69] The accusation that Stalin coldly and cynically abandoned the EAM, which was able to retake all of Greece in October 1944, proved damaging to his reputation in left-wing circles. Some historians, including Gabriel Kolko and Geoffrey Roberts, believe that the importance of the agreement is overstated. [70] Kolko writes: At the Yalta Conference (February 1945), Roosevelt proposed that the issues raised in the percentage agreement be decided by the new United Nations. Stalin was appalled because he wanted a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. [82] According to Melvyn Leffler, Churchill tried to abandon the percentage agreement after the end of the world war and the visit of Greece. [83] This was particularly the case, with Churchill and Roosevelt keeping such discretion over the agreement that their successors in power did not know it. Meanwhile, Stalin initially believed that the secret agreement was more important than Yalta`s public agreement, which led to his perception of betrayal and the growing urgency to secure friendly governments on the ussr`s border. [85] Harriman did not attend the Churchill-Stalin summit in Moscow, but he did his best to keep Roosevelt informed of what was discussed, although he mostly never talked about percentages. [60] Harriman`s information on the Anglo-Soviet summit was generally accurate, although the Churchill-Stalin talks, which he did not know existed, were generally accurate.
[60] Over the next few months, Roosevelt did not welcome the full content of the Moscow summit and the percentage agreement. [60] In response to American assertions that Britain is making a „policy of power“ in Greece, he took it into a speech: „What is power politics?… Is a navy twice as big as any other navy in world power politics? Is the world`s largest air force, with bases in all parts of world power politics? Do we have all the gold in the politics of world power? If that is the case, we are certainly not guilty of these offences, I must unfortunately say. These are luxury products that have gone from us. [80] Churchill reflected the lingering bitterness towards American criticism of his policy during the Dekemvriana and in 1947 presented the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine as a belated American recognition of the correctness of his Greek policy and wrote how subsequent events had „perfectly justified“ his action. [81] Churchill opposed the statement of the sitting Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the Senate in 1947 that the victory of the Greek Communists in the Greek Civil War was „dangerous“ for the United States and the American „vehement criticism“ of British policy in dekemvriana. [81] At least part of the reasons Churchill revealed the agreement as a percentage in triumph and tragedy was to present himself as a far-sighted statesman who had cleverly signed the percentage agreement to prevent the Soviet Union from supporting the EAM. [81] In a telegram sent to Roosevelt on 11 October, Churchill wrote: „Stalin and I should try to have a common opinion on the Balkans, so that we can prevent civil wars from taking place in several countries if they and I sympathize with a page and the United States.